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SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OF THE LAW
OF PATENTS.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in the closing years
of its ordinary appellate jurisdiction, has settled several hitherto
vexed questions of patent law, and has shed new light upon
others. It is doubtful whether any other like period in the his-
tory of this law has been distinguished by so many important
decisions. It would seem as though the Supreme Court had dis-
cussed and disposed of the questions presented, having in mind
that the principles and rules enunciated must serve as perma-
nent guides for the new Circuit Courts of Appeal.
It has become the fashion, among the patent bar, to con-
tend that these decisions have revolutionized rather than devel-
oped the former practice and law. This tendency has been
especially noticeable since, under the operation of the Evarts
Act, the Circuit Courts of Appeal have become the tribunals of
last resort.
It is true that the Supreme Court has made some material
modifications in the generally accepted theories as to certain
phases of patent law. Thus, by a strict interpretation of the
statute, it has been decided that the term of a United States
patent is limited by the duration of a foreign patent for the
same invention (Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U.S. I).
Subsequent to the jurisdiction act of x887 and prior to In re
Hohorst, i5o U. S. 659, it had been generally supposed that
suits for infringement of patents against citizens of the United
States could only be brought within the district where defend-
ant resided. It now appears to be the prevailing opinion in
view of In re Hohorst, supra and In re Keasbey & Mattison Co.,
16o U. S. 221, that such suits may be brought in any district in
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which the defendant may be found. It is hardly necessary to
suggest the strategic importance of this decision in many cases.
This doctrine, and the rule that the burden of proof is
upon a complainant, in a suit for infringement, to allege and
prove actual or constructive notice of the patent (Dunlop v.
Schofield, 152 U. S. 244; Coupe v. Royer, 155 U. S. 584) are
contrary to the general practice formerly prevailing in the lower
courts, and are not easily reconcilable with some of the earlier
decisions of the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court has also definitely determined the rela-
tions of the Federal Government to owners of patents. It is
now settled that while the Federal Government is liable under
its contract for the use of a patented invention, it is not liable in
tort, and an officer of the United States exercising his official
functions in the use of Government property, cannot be
restrained by injunction against infringement (U. S. v. Berdan
Fire-arms Co., x56 U. S. 552; Belknap v. Schild, i61 U. S. io;
Kirk v. U. S., 163 U. S. 49).
In actions at law it has sharply drawn the distinction between
the respective functions of court and jury in cases of infringe-
ment (Coupe v. Royer, i65 U. S. 565; Black Diamond Co. v.
Excelsior Co., 156 U. S. 61r; Market-street Cable Co. v. Rowley,
355 U. S. 621), and has held that the statutes of limitation of the
various States are applicable thereto (Campbell v. Haverhill,
155 U. S. 61o). It has approved the practice of taking advan-
tage on demurrer of invalidity apparent on the face of a patent
(Richards v. Chase Elevator Co., 158 U. S. 3oo) has laid down
the rule that the decision of the Patent Office upon questions of
priority is conclusive thereafter between the parties, unless the
contrary is established by indisputable evidence (Morgan v.
Daniels, 153 U. S. 120), and has strictly enforced the doctrine :f
estoppel in the determination of the rights of employers in
patents taken out by employees (Lane v. Locke, i5o U. S. i93;
Gill v. U. S., I6o U. S. 426).
In the Singer Sewing Machine case the relations between the
public and the owner of a patent at the date of its expiration,
are exhaustively discussed. The court there holds that a gen-
eric name passes to the public simultaneously with the dedica-
tion resulting from the expiration of the patent (Singer Mfg. Co.
v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U. S. x69.
Upon the vexed question of damages, it has declared the
unsatisfactory doctrine, that while at law a plaintiff is entitled to
recover what he has lost even though it exceed defendant's
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profits, a defendant in equity is liable to account only for such
profits as are found to have actually accrued to him from the use
of the patented invention (Belknap v. Schild, i6i U. S. io; Key-
stone Mfg. Co. v. Adams, i51 U. S. 139; Coupe v. Royer, 155
U. S. 565, 583).
The question as to what constitutes invention is necessarily
left to be determined upon the facts in the particular case. A
valuable modification of the tests formerly employed is found in
Potts v. Craeger, 155 U. S. 597, where, inter alia, it is held that
a double use may involve invention provided the second use is
in an art remote from the former art.
The cases which have been most extensively discussed are
Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., ii U. S. i89; Risdon v. Medart, i58
U. S. 68, and Morgan v. Albany Co., 1 5 2 U. S. 425.
In Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., the inventor claimed two differ-
ent functions or operations of a spring in separate patents. The
Supreme Court found that the operation covered by the second
patent was necessarily included in that of the earlier one, and
might have been claimed therein, and that the two functions were
identical. It held that where matters covered by a second
patent were thus inseparably involved in matters embraced in a
former patent, issued to the same inventor, the second patent
was void. The use of the term "inseparably involved" gave
rise to much contention among the patent bar. It has been
strenuously claimed that a generic description of an invention
and a specific description of a definite combination of elements
embodying the invention in a particular form with or without
improvements thereon, were so inseparably involved that they
could not be the subjects of separate patents. It is to be borne
in mind, however, that in Miller v. Eagle Co., the devices of the
two patents were identical in construction and operation, and
the second patent was for a function necessarily exercised in the
first patent. If the words "inseparably involved" be limited to
such identity, and the other language used by the court be con-
fined to the case there presented, it will not be found that it lays
down any rule inconsistent with the previous decisions of the
court. It seems now to be recognized by the Circuit Courts
that the term is to be limited to cases where the second patent
claims a function necessarily performed by the device of the
first patent. If the claims of the two patents specify different
parts of a combination or if one omits one or more of the ele-
ments contained in the other, they are not "inseparably involved"
(Walker on Patents, 3 d edition, §i8oa; Thomson-Houston Elect.
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Co. v. Winchester Ave. Ry. Co., 71 Fed. 205; Id. v. Elmira & H.
Ry. Co., 71 Fed. 405; Deering.v. Winona Co., 155 U. S. 286;
Fassett v. Ewart Mfg. Co., 62 Fed. 407; McBride v. Kingman,
72 Fed. 908).
"The test of identity is whether both when properly 'con-
strued in the light of the description define essentially the
same thing. When the claims of both cover and control essen-
tially the same subject matter both are for the same invention
and the later patent is void" (Thomson-Houston El. Co. v.
Elmira & H. Ry. Co., supra).
In this connection may also be considered the case of Risdon
v. Medart, 158 U. S. 68. There the court stated that as a gen-
eral rule neither a process not involving chemical or other ele-
mental change but consisting solely in the operation of a
machine, nor the function of a machine, was patentable. Here
again, when the patent for the machine covers the invention by
which the process is necessarily carried on, there is but one
invention and but one patent therefor. The application of this
principle, however, is attended with great difficulty. As Mr.
Walker says in his work on patents: "This question of the
patentability of processes which consist entirely of mechanical
transactions, but which may be performed by hand, or by any of
several different mechanisms or machines, is the most important
unsettled question known to the patent laws of the United
States." Walker on Patents, § 3a.
The distinction between a process and a function had already
been previously repeatedly announced and applied in the second
Circuit (Risdon v. Medart, supra; see, also, Blakesley Novelty
Co. v. Conn. Webb Co., 78 Fed.; Travers v. Gem Hammock
and Fly Net Co., 75 0. G. 678; Wells Glass Co. v. Henderson,
67 Fed. 935).
If, however, there is such a change in the method or arrange-
ment of operations as involves invention and produces a new and
useful result, and if it covers only means or methods of producing
such result irrespective of the effect of mechanism, the process
may be the subject of a separate patent (Risdon v. Medart,
supra; Schwarzwalder v. N. Y. Filter Co., 66 Fed. 157).
In Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Paper Co., 132 U. S.
425, the Supreme Court passed on the comparatively modern
doctrine of contributory infringement. There the plaintiff sold
patented fixtures for delivering toilet paper to such persons only
as dealt in and used its toilet paper. Defendants having
obtained such patented fixtures from the original purchasers
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from the patentee, fitted them with paper of their own manu-
facture and also sold their paper to others with the intention
that such paper should be used in plaintiff's fixtures. The
Supreme Court affirmed the principle already announced by the
lower courts "that the manufacture and sale of a single element
of a combination with intent that it shall be united to the other
elements and so complete the combination is an infringement."
But it held that this doctrine had no application to cases where
the element made by the alleged infringer was not separately
patented and was of a perishable nature to be delivered by the
combination and used periodically when put in actual use.
In the further consideration of the development of or limita.
tions upon this doctrine two questions have arisen:
Is the alleged infringement reconstruction or repairs?
May the owner of the patent lawfully impose a limitation
upon a purchaser as to the use to which such combination is to
be put?
As to the first question the Court of Appeals in the Eighth Cir-
cuit in Shickle Harrison & Howard Iron Co. v. St. Louis Cai-
Coupler Co., 77 Fed. 739, holds that the fact that the alleged
infringing article is an important element of the patented com-
bination and only capable of use in connection with the other
elements thereof is not conclusive against the right to replace,
but that when it is liable to break or wear out long before the
rest of the combination, and other parts are equally or more
important and the invention is not confined to the part broken,
anyone may furnish to original purchasers a new article to re-
place the worn out or broken one, but could not sell to other
persons or for other purposes.
The same rule is applied by the Court of Appeals in the Sec-
ond Circuit in Thomson-Houston Co. v. Kelsey El. Ry. Spec.
Co., 75 Fed. ioog, where the defendant, by public advertise-
ment, had offered to sell to the public generally one element of
a patented combination. There the defendant was permitted
to sell said elements to replace those broken or worn out, or to
substitute its manufacture for those sold by complainant, but was
enjoined against the reconstruction of those not so sold. See also
Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 78 Fed. 139.
In Heaton v. Peninsular Button Fastener Co. v. Eureka
Specialty Co., 77 Fed 288, the parties sought to take advantage
of the principles enunciated in the decision in Morgan Envelope
Co. v. Albany Paper Co., supra. The complainant sold a
patented machine for affixing buttons to shoes, upon the condi-
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tion that it should only be used. in connection with the unpat-
ented staples made by it. The defendants manufactured staples
adapted only for use in said machines and induced purchasers of
said machines to buy their staples in violation of said restriction.
The court below dismissed the bill on demurrer on the theory
that it would be contrary to public policy to enforce said
restriction. The Court of Appeals held that the rules as to con-
tributory infringement already considered were applicable to the
facts as charged in the bill and reversed the decree.
On the other hand in Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co.,
157 U. S. 659, the Supreme Court has held, three Justices dis-
senting, that the purchaser of a car-load of beds from the owner
of the territorial right for the State of Michigan, for the express
purpose of selling them in Massachusetts, had the right to sell
them anywhere within the United States, even within territory
alr~ady assigned to another party. In the forcible dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Brown it is pointed out that the effect of
this decision is to place it in the power of a patentee to sell
licenses to make and sell for every State in the Union except his
own, and to then establish a rival factory and undersell and ruin
his licensees.
These cases show something of the present status and
tendency of the law of patents in the United States. The
charge of departure from principles heretofore established pre-
viously referred to, appear to be due to a strict application by
the Supreme Court of the rules of law and statutory construction
to questions of jurisdiction, practice and evidence at the expense
in some instances of the doctrine of stare decisis.
But in its disposition of the fundamental questions of inven-
tion, infringements and the respective rights and obligations of
patentees and the public, the Supreme Court has consistently
applied and developed the earlier decisions.
It is impossible to predict the influence which the Supreme
Court is hereafter to exert upon the law relating to inventors.
This will largely depend upon the extent to which the Circuit
Courts of Appeals may certify to it, or it may deem it advisable
by certiorari to pass upon, new questions concerning which there
may be a division of opinion in the various circuits.
It is a matter for congratulation that the structure of the
patent law of to-day rests on such a firm foundation and has
been so harmoniously built up that the additions of the future
must be in the line of development subordinate to the existing
plan. William K. Townsend.
